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FIRST AMENDMENT

In re Parochiaid:
Church-State Wall of Separation Scrutinized-Again
by Neal Devins

Aguilar, Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Education
and Chancellor of the Board of Education
of New York City

v.
Felton
(Docket Nos. 84-237,84-238 & 84-239)

Argued December 5, 1984
ISSUE

Federal aid to parochial schools is the subject of
Aguilar v. Feltou. At issue is a provision in the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act which authorizes comparable federal funding of remedial education for educationally deprived children in low income areas w~o
attend private schools. Specifically, the Felton case mvolves a constitutional challenge to New York City's
practice of sending public school teachers to private
schools to provide such remedial education services.
It is unlikely that the decision ultimately rendered in
Felton will clarify the present widespread confusion in
church-state jurisprudence. Yet, Fel1J1l might close a
chapter on one particularly vexing issue-namely, government involvement with religious schools. In recent
years, the Court has intimated that government, under
proper circumstances, may play some role i~ the se~ular
educational function of children attendmg pnvate
schools. Yet, Supreme Court "parochiaid" decisions are
so intricate as to speak only to the particular facts of a
case. Felton may end this confusion and establish broad
parameters for permissible government involvement
with religious schools.
FACTS

Under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, school systems may receive federal aid for
those programs: 1) designed to meet the special educational needs of economically and educationally deprived
children, 2) which supplement rather than supplant
nonfederally-funded programs and 3) extend program
services on an equal and equitable basis to eligible children who attend private schools. In New York City,
starting in August of 1966, city-employed Title I teach-
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ers were sent into the private schools during regular
school hours. Under this arrangement, contacts between
Title l administrators and private school officials involve
the city's processing private school requests for Title I
assistance and private schools providing information to
the city concerning its planned scheduling of classes.
Private school officials also suggest which of their students should participate in the Title I program, although Title I officials need not accept these
recommendations.
In an attempt to ensure that Title I teachers do not
involve themselves with or become influenced by sectarian components of parochial school instruction, these
teachers were prohibited from: I) introducing religious
matter into their teaching; 2) permitting parochial
school teachers a role in either selecting students or
teaching courses, and 3) permitting private school teachers access to Title I materials or equipment. Additionally, public school field supervisors were supposed to
make periodic unannounced visits to ensure compliance
with program guidelines. Finally, participating parochial schools were required to "sanitize" or strip all religious symbols from the walls of classrooms and other
facilities before those rooms could be used for Title I
purposes.
A group of taxpayers from the Eastern District of
New York brought suit challenging New York's practice
of onsite instruction by Title I teachers at parochial
schools. These taxpayers claimed that such onsite instruction did not pass muster under the three-part test
frequently used by the Supreme Court to determine
whether the government action violates the Establishment Clause. As stated in Lemon v. Kurtzman: (403 U.S.
602 (1971)) "First, the statute [or program] must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally [it] must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion" (403 U.S. 602,
612-13). Taxpayers alleged that New York's Title 1 program has the primary effect of both advancing and
inhibiting religion. Taxpayers further contended that
the program has the potential for excessive entanglement.
Taxpayers claim that religion is inhibited because the
Title I program seeks to "desanctify" otherwise religious
elements of church school education. Taxpayers claim
that religion is advanced in several ways: 1) Title I teachers lend the prestige of government to the church

Issue No.9

195

HeinOnline -- 1984-1985 Preview U.S. Sup. Ct. Cas. 195 1984-1985

school; 2) Title I teachers aid the sectarian function of
parochial schools by improving the basic skills of remedial students, and 3) unascertainable content of Title I
teachers' instruction necessarily advances religion.
Taxpayers also claim that: "The potential for excessive entanglement [in New York City's program] is sufficient to condemn the program." For example, noting
the difficulty of monitoring possibly religious-advancing
contact between Title I teachers and parochial school
officials, taxpayers argue that: "any such 'system of surveillance would have to be so oppressive as to crea1e ...
entanglement."
The Secretary of Education, the Chancellor of New
York City's Board of Education and affected private
school parents (hereafter "education officials") join together in this case and disagree with taxpayers' assertions. Central to their argument is the contention that
"time and experience" demonstrate that the New York
City program "does not in fact constitute 'a step towards
establishment' or create any of the substantive evils
against which the clause is designed to protect." In regard to taxpayers' claim that the Title I program has the
impermissible effect of both advancing and inhibiting
religion, the education officials assert that this claim is
inaccurate because Title I aid is provided directly to
eligible students, not to the schools they attend; Title I is
a neutral program, primarily extending aid to students
attending public schools; and Title I aid is only used for
secular activities.
The education officials also contend that the taxpayers' excessive entanglement claim is erroneous. Instead,
they argue that, unlike earlier cases, here "there is no
need for continuing and intensive surveillance ... to
prevent impermissible fostering of religion." To support
his contention, they assert that the parochial schools
involved are not pervasively sectarian; that Title I services are provided directly to the students by Title I
teachers, and that New York City has structured its
program so as "to insulate it from rrivate school influence and assure it complete autonomy."
At the district court level, the New York City program was upheld as constitutional. Key to this holding
was an identical 1980 Southern District of New York
decision, National Coalition for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Harris (489 F. Supp. I248 (S.D.N.Y.
I980)). Harris was dismissed by the Supreme Court for
want of jurisdiction since plaintiffs failed to file their
appeal in a timely fashion (449 U.S. 808 (1980)). On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.
Although recognizing "that the City had made sincere and largely successful efforts to prevent the public
school teachers and other professionals whom it sends
into religious schools from giving sectarian instruction
or otherwise fostering religion," the appellate court
claimed that it was bound by the Supreme Court's deci-

sion in Meek v. Pi/linger (421 U.S. 349 ( 1975). Meek invalidated a Pennsylvania statute which, among other things,
provided "[onsite] services for the improvement of the
educationally disadvantaged (such as, but not limited to,
teaching English as a second language)." Although recognizing that, unlike Lemon v. Kurtzma11, decided four
years earlier "the teachers and counselors providing
auxiliary services are employees of the public intermediate unit, rather than of the church-related schools in
which they work," the court in Meek concluded that this
"does not substantially eliminate the need for continuing
surveillance."
The education officials' introduction of evidence
suggesting that the New York City program had a secular effect was viewed as irrelevant by the appellate court
in this case; the Second Circuit held that 1\-leek still controls.
It is now argued before the Supreme Court that this
conclusion is erroneous because: l) private schools are
not pervasively sectarian, and 2) New York City's Title I
program ensures a secular content to its remedial programs without obtrusive church-state contracts. Taxpayers disagree with both of these assertions.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE

Felton, for several reasons, will prove to be a significant church-state decision. First and foremost, if the
Court upholds New York City's Title I program, Supreme Court decisions such as Lemon and Meek will be of
questionable validity. Those decisions of a decade ago
created a Catch-22 situation for state aid to parochial
schools. On one hand, the Court assumed that aid to
pervasively religious church schools would necessarily
have the impermissible primary effect of advancing religion unless substantial supervisory safeguards were utilized by the state to monitor the aid program. On the
other hand, the Court assumed that the sort of
safeguards needed to effectively monitor the church
school would impermissibly entangle the state with religion. As can be seen by the Second Circuit's application
of Meek, Felton challenges this so-called fJer se rule.
Second, if the Court upholds New York City's program, Felton may create a new per se rule. This new rule
would find per se constitutional all financially neutral
government aid to education programs. In other words,
since comparable Title I benefits extend to both public
and private school students, the Court may hold that
there is no need to undertake a searching inquiry about
New York City's implementation of its Title I program.
Alternatively, and more likely, the Court will pay some
attention both to the adequacy and scope of administrative safeguards designed to prevent illegal church-state
involvements. (This possibility is heightened by a December, 1984 federal district court decision, Wamble v.
Bell, which held that Missouri's Title I program-as
implemmted-is illegal under the Establishment Clause.
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Third, should the Court uphold the appellate court
ruling, Felton would highlight the "educational costs" of
church-state separation. All parties and the appellate
court agree that New York City's Title I program has
been a success. To invalidate the program, underprivileged children will be denied important benefitS! of remedial education. Yet, that is a cost that the First
Amendment might countenance. At the same time, that
might be a cost that the Supreme Court views as higher
than the wall purportedly separating church from state.

ARGUMENTS

For Private SchCiol Parents (Counsel of Record, Charles fl.
Wilson, 839 17th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006; telephone
(202) 331-5000; For the Secretary of Education (Counsel, Rex
E. Lee, Department ofjustice, Washington, DC 20530; telephone
(202) 633-2217); For the Chancellor of the Board of Education of the City of New York (Counsel of Record, Frederick A.O.
Schwarz, 100 Church Street, New York, NY 10007; telephone
(212) 566-4338)
I. The court of appeals' application of the per se test
(and concomitant failure to consider the proferred
evidentiary record) was in error, for government
neutrality towards, and accommodation of, religion
are central Establishment Clause concerns.
2. New York City's Title I program does not violate the
Establishment Clause for it has: a) a secular purpose;

b) a secular effect, and c) does not involve (nor does it
have the potential to involve) the state in religious
affairs.
For the Taxpayer (Counsel of Record, Stanley Geller, 400
Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10017; telephone(212) 7552040)
I. By requiring that religious objects be removed from
Title I classrooms, the New York City program has
the impermissible effect of inhibiting religious observance.
2. The New· York City program has the impermissible
affect of advancing religion.
3. The court of appeals' application of per se test was
valid, for the New York City program has the potential for excessive entanglement.
AMICUS BRIEFS

In Support of the Education Officials
Briefs were filed by the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights; United States Catholic Conference; Citizens for Educational Freedom; Council for
American Private Education and the National jewish
Commission on Law and Public Affairs.
In Support of the Taxpayers
An amicus brief was filed by Americans United for
Separation of Church and State.
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